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Introduction
In Part One of this two-part series we considered the ways in which international investment
agreements (IIAs) and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism contained therein
are not effective, or at least not optimally effective, at advancing the four often-cited objectives of
IIAs and ISDS:2 (1) promoting investment flows; (2) depoliticizing disputes; (3) promoting the rule
of law; and (4) providing compensation for harms to investors. We also touched on the important
question of whether the objectives themselves should be fundamentally revisited to meet 21st
century needs and priorities, including the Sustainable Development Goals.3
Here, we consider four alternative approaches to ISDS – whether under ad hoc arbitration or a more
permanent body, such as an “investment court” – that, when used alone or in combination, might
better serve the oft-stated objectives, looking in particular at how those alternatives might advance
revisited objectives, aligned with 21st century priorities. These alternatives include:
• strengthening domestic legal systems,
• the use of risk insurance by investors,
• using state-state cooperation and dispute settlement mechanisms, and
• using existing human rights mechanisms for certain kinds of redress.
The actual and potential roles of these alternatives raise questions about continued reliance on ISDS,
challenging assumptions that ISDS is necessary or even optimal for sound investment promotion or
governance aims. Rather than continuing to integrate ISDS within investment treaties, it is therefore
important to take a closer look at these alternatives, their complementary functions, and their
advantages and disadvantages as tools to support modern, and even traditional, objectives.

Strengthening Domestic Legal Systems
Efforts to strengthen domestic legal systems can be made and implemented on a unilateral basis.
However, treaties could also play a role in supporting, monitoring, and enforcing those efforts.
Treaties could, for example, establish:
•
•
•
•

an agreed definition of the “rule of law” to be employed by treaty parties in the context of
the agreement, and commitments by the states to uphold and promote the rule of law as
defined;
commitments and/or mechanisms for financial and/or technical assistance to build capacity,
or cooperation to identify or address existing issues regarding domestic rule of law;
mechanisms for monitoring the rule of law;
triggers for dialogue between the states, or dialogue between the states and a treaty body or
expert institution in order to address identified issues;

2

Lise Johnson, Brooke Güven, Jesse Coleman, 'Investor-State Dispute Settlement: What Are We Trying to
Achieve? Does ISDS Get us There?' (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 11 December 2017) <
ccsi.columbia.edu/2017/12/11/investor-state-dispute-settlement-what-are-we-trying-to-achieve-does-isdsget-us-there/> accessed 1 April 2019.
3
For an extensive discussion of how IIAs and their dispute settlement mechanisms align with the
development objectives of governments, see Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, Nathan Lobel, ‘Aligning International
Investment Agreements with the Sustainable Development Goals’ forthcoming 2019; see also Emma Aisbett,
Bernali Choudhury, Olivier de Schutter, Frank Garcia, James Harrison, Song Hong, Lise Johnson,
Mouhamadou Kane, Santiago Peña, Matthew Porterfield, Susan Sell, Stephen E. Shay, Louis T. Wells,
‘Rethinking International Investment Governance: Principles for the 21st Century’ (2018).
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•
•

an independent body responsible for issuing reports on the rule of law in the treaty parties;
and/or
mechanisms for enforcement of rule of law standards and commitments, and/or sanctions
for non-compliance.

One example of a treaty-based mechanism for addressing rule of law challenges can be found in
the EU: under Article 7 TEU4 and the Framework on the Rule of Law,5 the European Commission
can address, among other concerns, serious and systemic rule of law failures.
As compared to ISDS, which only is relevant when rule of law failures negatively impact foreign
investors, treaty mechanisms to strengthen domestic legal systems would improve domestic rule
of law for all stakeholders, and would commit treaty parties to address rule of law problems
irrespective of which stakeholder group was negatively impacted.
Insofar as a strong and stable domestic judicial system is a consideration for investors when making
locational investment decisions, such efforts to strengthen the domestic judicial system and
corresponding institutions should improve the attractiveness of host governments for increased
foreign investment and continued reinvestment.
Implementing this alternative would likely entail and, indeed, depend upon inter-state diplomatic
engagement, particularly but not only when one country adopts measures that negatively impact
the investors of another country. Thus, this approach may not de-politicize all investor-state
disputes that arise; nevertheless, as noted in our earlier piece on the objectives of ISDS,

4

“1. On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parliament or by the
European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after obtaining the
consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member
State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the
Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in accordance with the same
procedure.
The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which such a determination was made continue to
apply.
2. The European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a
serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2, after inviting the
Member State in question to submit its observations.
3. Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified majority,
may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State
in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the
Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a suspension on
the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons.
The obligations of the Member State in question under the Treaties shall in any case continue to be binding
on that State.
4. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide subsequently to vary or revoke measures taken
under paragraph 3 in response to changes in the situation which led to their being imposed.
5. The voting arrangements applying to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council
for the purposes of this Article are laid down in Article 354 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.”
5
‘Effective Justice’ (European Commission) <ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamentalrights/effective-justice_en> accessed 1 April 2019.
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“politicization” is not necessarily bad. It is not synonymous with “gunboat diplomacy”6 of the past
and can be useful for finding reasonable solutions to disputes.7 Giving governments a framework
and tools for systematically addressing rule of law matters may also help improve political dialogue
on these issues.
Efforts to help improve domestic rule of law, such as those in place in the EU, are designed to
address systemic failures; in contrast to ISDS, they are not designed to provide monetary or other
relief in particular cases to particular aggrieved individuals or entities. Thus, such dedicated
systems for establishing and maintaining the rule of law for all stakeholders, including investors,
may not score as high on the “providing aggrieved investors compensation” objective as ISDS
currently does. Indeed, IIAs and ISDS provide covered investors greater rights than are available
under domestic legal systems, including legal systems with relatively strong, independent courts
and property rights protections.8 Thus, doing away with those IIA/ISDS preferences and focusing
instead on ensuring effective access to protections and remedies available under domestic law may
narrow the claims investors are permitted to bring against states and the financial awards they can
recover. But, as discussed further in our blog on objectives, that outcome – reducing the scope of
potential claims and financial awards – may not be bad, as the relatively broad powers ISDS
provides investors to sue and recover damages from states arguably do not make sound policy
sense.9
Additionally, a more solid foundation for the rule of law and strengthened domestic institutions
may prevent some losses in the first place, and may be particularly important for domestic
citizens and companies (e.g., the employees, suppliers, and consumers of foreign invested firms
whose economic and social well-being and confidence can be crucial to foreign investors’ interest
and success), as well as for small- and medium-sized foreign investors for whom ISDS is likely
impractical due to the costs and duration of such cases.

6

Geoffrey Gertz, Srividya Jandhyala, Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, ‘Legalization, Diplomacy, And
Development: Do Investment Treaties De-Politicize Investment Disputes?’ (2018) 107 World Development
238.
7
Jason Yackee, ‘Politicized Dispute Settlement in the Pre-Investment Treaty Era: A Micro-Historical
Approach’ [2017] Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1412.
8
See, e.g., ‘Opening Statement of USTR Robert Lighthizer to the House Ways and Means Committee’
(Office of the United States Trade Representative, 21 March 2018) <ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2018/march/opening-statement-ustr-robert> accessed 1 April 2019 (noting that ISDS
provides foreign investors greater rights than domestic investors); Shawn Nichols, ‘Expanding Property
Rights Under Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Class Struggle In The Era Of Transnational Capital’
(2018) 25(2) Review of International Political Economy 243; Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs, Jeffrey Sachs,
‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and US Domestic Law’ (2015) CCSI Policy Paper <
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019; David Gaukrodger, ‘Investment Treaties and
Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss: Insights from Advanced Systems of Corporate Law’ (2014) OECD
Working Papers on International Investment 2014/2 < http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP2014_02.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019.
9
See, e.g., Robert Howse, ‘International Investment Law and Arbitration: A Conceptual Framework’ (2017)
Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper 2017/1 <https://www.iilj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/Howse_IILJ_2017_1-MegaReg.pdf> accessed 1 April 2019 (discussing concerns
regarding approaches to compensation for losses due to regulatory activity).
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Political and Other Risk Insurance
Political risk insurance10 (PRI) covers political events11 and the direct and indirect actions of host
governments including: expropriation, currency inconvertibility, transfers restriction, political
violence (war, terrorism, civil disturbance), breach of contract, and arbitration award default. Some
providers also offer insurance protection for certain regulatory risks12 including material changes to
feed-in-tariff schemes, critical changes to taxation or other regulations affecting the project’s ability
to operate, and revocation of necessary licenses or permits. Companies may also be able to secure
insurance for losses associated with government penalties and fines, exposure due to mistaken and
overly aggressive tax positions, critical changes to taxation, and liability to private parties for
environmental or other torts.13
Each of those types of risks has been the subject of a successful ISDS claim.14 Given that the risk
insurance (RI) market – which includes both political risk insurance and other commercial risk
insurance available through private sector providers – may offer protections that are also offered by
investment treaties and ISDS, it is important to consider whether and how the costs and benefits of
RI for those risks compares with ISDS.
This alternative is perhaps most relevant to the goal of investment promotion. RI, like ISDS, can
potentially encourage investment that would have otherwise been deterred due to concerns about
risk. However, unlike ISDS, which effectively acts as broad, exclusion-free and premium-free RI,15
RI requires the investor, at least to some extent, to internalize the costs of the risk it is taking. Based
on the cost of premiums, limitations on insurance, and/or exclusions from coverage, RI, can send
important market-based signals about the riskiness of any particular investment or investment
location. In some cases, it makes policy sense to ensure those signals regarding risk are strong. It
would be hard to make a policy case, for instance, that we should be shielding investors from the
10

Kathryn Gordon, ‘Investment Guarantees and Political Risk Insurance: Institutions, Incentives and
Development’ [2008] OECD Investment Policy Perspectives, 91.
11
World Investment and Political Risk 2013. Washington, DC: MIGA, World Bank Group.
12
‘Regulatory
Risk’
(OPIC)
<www.opic.gov/what-we-offer/political-risk-insurance/types-ofcoverage/regulatory-risk> accessed 1 April 2019.
13
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle Logue, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral
Hazard’ (2012) 111 Michigan Law Review 197; Kyle D. Logue, ‘Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax
Insurance’ (2005) 25 Virginia Tax Review 339.
14
See, e.g., Novenergia II – Energy & Environment (SCA) v Spain, SCC Case No 2015/063, Final Arbitral
Award (February 15, 2018) (finding a breach of the FET obligation relating to a reduction in subsidies for
renewable energy projects); Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues
of Jurisdiction and on Liability, September 12, 2014 (holding Ecuador liable adoption of “windfall profits”
taxes); Bear Creek v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/2, Award, November 30, 2017 (finding Peru liable for
revocation of an authorization necessary to hold and develop a mining concession); Occidental Petroleum
Corporation v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, October 5, 2012 (finding Ecuador liable for
exercising contractual termination clause on the ground that it was a disproportionate response or too
punitive); Chevron v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA 2009-23, Second Partial Award on Track II, August 30,
2018 (finding, inter alia, that the government violated the investment treaty by allowing tort plaintiffs’ claims
against Chevron to proceed in court); Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. Russia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case
No. AA 226, Final Award, July 18, 2014 (finding the government liable for its response to the claimant’s
aggressive tax strategies); Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. Russia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No.
AA 227, Final Award, July 18, 2014 (same); Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. Russia, UNCITRAL,
PCA Case No. AA 228, Final Award, July 18, 2014 (same).
15
Phil Levy, ‘Critique of NAFTA Provision Highlights Team Trump's Misconceptions on Investment
Abroad’ (Forbes, 23 October 2017) <www.forbes.com/sites/phillevy/2017/10/23/should-team-trumpencourage-investment-in-mexico/#1268a86f70b4> accessed 1 April 2019.
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risk that future government regulation will require stranding of their fossil fuel assets; or that we
should be shielding companies adopting aggressive tax planning strategies from the risk that
governments will modify laws (or interpretation thereof) to combat base erosion and profit shifting.
In other cases, we may indeed want to decrease risk, for instance to encourage sustainable
investment into conflict-afflicted regions, or to support use of innovative technologies or practices.
Policy discussions of insurance therefore often involve complex but fundamental questions
regarding what types of behavior insurance should and should not encourage and how to avoid
moral hazards promoting undesirable risk-taking. While these issues are central in discourse on
insurance and insurance regulation, they rarely figure in discussions of investment treaties and
ISDS. Investment treaties and ISDS generally protect – and therefore presumably aim to promote
- investments irrespective of their activities or impacts. There is little, if any, consideration of the
moral hazards that might be created for investors by protecting them from – or giving them
powerful tools to combat – a broad range of risks such as changes in tax law, policies halting new
fossil fuel projects, and tort claims brought by domestic citizens.
Relatedly, investments supported by RI may be more likely to provide sustainable development
benefits in their host countries (or, at least, not cause harms). This is crucial due to the fact that, as
noted in the discussion on objectives, not all foreign investment is beneficial for host (or home)
countries and therefore worth promoting. RI providers (who are themselves subject to human rights
obligations)16 can specifically require compliance with certain international human rights, anticorruption, environmental and other sustainable development norms. For example, OPIC, the
United States Government’s overseas political risk insurance provider, imposes on policy holders
standards relating to the environment, labor, human rights, and the development effects in the host
state.17 Indeed, as noted by some commentators, both public and private insurers can play a crucial
quasi-regulatory role to help improve the conduct, and reduce the undesirable risk-taking, of their
insured.18 Due to the knowledge and expertise they have about the conduct of their policyholders
and the factors giving rise to risks, their incentives to limit payouts, and their ability to set premiums
and other contract terms, RI providers can develop and encourage adherence to best practices in
the range of areas they cover.19 Therefore, unlike with ISDS, with RI, risk is assessed based on the
specific investment, the investor internalizes some of this risk through premiums, deductibles, and
exclusions, and sustainable development norms can be more meaningfully encouraged, monitored
and enforced.
In terms of impacts on domestic rule of law, there are some ways RI can potentially help improve
domestic legal systems, or at least avoid rewarding substandard conduct. Authoritarian governments
can use ISDS to reduce the riskiness of doing business in their territories without engaging in any

16

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect And Remedy" Framework’ (UN 2011)
<https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf> accessed 1 April
2019.
17
‘Political Risk Insurance’ (OPIC) <www.opic.gov/content/eligibility> accessed 1 April 2019.
18
Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle Logue, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard’ (2012)
111 Michigan Law Review 197; Kernaghan Webb, ‘Political Risk Insurance and the Mining Sector: An
Analysis of the Regulatory Effects of Contracts’ (2012) 54 International Journal of Law and Management
394; Howard Kunreuther, Matthew W. White and Haitao Yin, ‘Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing
Effort: Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?’ (2011) 54 Journal of Law and
Economics 325; Christian Lahnstein, ‘Tort Law and the Ethical Responsibilities of Liability Insurers:
Comments from a Reinsurer’s Perspective’ (2011) 103 Journal of Business Ethics 87, 91, 93..
19
See sources cited supra n. 18.
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real domestic legal reforms.20 Governments can cater to and capture benefits offered by foreign
investors (e.g., through signing bonuses for contracts, tax and royalty payments, and bribery), while
suppressing the rights and voices of their domestic citizens. When an investor is covered by an
investment treaty and ISDS, it benefits from a set of legal protections and tools that largely insulates
the investor from the domestic legal context, and pays nothing for that protection. In contrast, the
price of RI will vary based on the host country, where higher prices charged for insurance in risky
countries compared to less risky countries may serve to help channel investment away from the
riskiest destinations and toward the better governed ones. While RI generally may make investors
more willing to invest in risky locations, pricing of RI can still make investing in certain locations
undesirable. This, in turn, and in contrast to ISDS, can send host governments signals that if they
want to attract investment, they need to improve their domestic climates.
Looking at impacts on state-state relations, in some cases, risk insurance – particularly
government-provided political risk insurance – might give rise to politicization. While host
government action triggering an insurance claim or payout may not spur home government
involvement if the insurance provider is a private company, the situation may be different if the
insurance provider is an entity of the home country, such as the United States’ OPIC, 21 or a
multilateral public RI provider, such as the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency.22 From the perspective of the investor, however, the dispute would not be “politicized”:
as with ISDS, an investor covered by RI can decide whether and when to bring a claim for
compensation for covered losses (subject to the terms of its policies), and the investor’s recovery
would not depend on its home government to pursue a claim. If the RI provider is a government
entity, however, the investor may be able to benefit from some “political” engagement as there are
indications that the actual or potential involvement of home country or multilateral risk insurance
providers can be helpful in resolving or avoiding investment disputes.23 Thus, as noted above, depoliticization may not always be the right objective as judged from the perspective of different
stakeholders.
Finally, with respect to the objective of investor compensation, risk insurance offers advantages
and disadvantages as compared with ISDS. RI may decrease the likelihood of harms because of
project selection and coverage criteria, and engagement with investors and host governments.
Additionally, when a loss does occur, litigation over whether and what payment is due may be less
costly and lengthy as those issues would be governed by contractual provisions that are more
specific and certain than the infamously vague standards of IIAs. Disadvantages from the
perspective of the investor include that recovery under an insurance policy may be subject to caps
and other contractual limitations not in place under investment treaties; grounds for recovery may
be narrower than protections under investment treaties; exhaustion of remedies may be required
under the insurance contract as a condition of filing a claim for compensation; and recovery will
need to take into account premiums and/or deductibles paid. While such limits are not necessarily
best-case options for individual investors, they may have important policy and practical rationales,
such as avoiding moral hazards, as discussed above.

20

See, e.g., Eric Arias, ‘Cooperative Autocracies: Leader Survival, Creditworthiness, and Bilateral
Investment Treaties’ (2018) 62 American Journal of Political Science 905; Mark Fathi Massoud,
‘International Arbitration And Judicial Politics In Authoritarian States’ (2014) 39 Law & Social Inquiry 1.
21
<www.opic.gov/> accessed 1 April 2019.
22
<www.miga.org/> accessed 1 April 2019.
23
Efraim Chalamish, Robert Howse, ‘Conceptualizing Political Risk Insurance: Toward a Legal and
Economic Analysis of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)' in Mathias Audit, Stephan
Schill (eds), Transnational Law of Public Contracts (Bruylant 2016).
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State-state Dispute Settlement
State-state dispute settlement clauses that allow states to initiate claims against their treaty-partners
with respect to harm to investors already exist in many investment treaties, sometimes alone, but
more commonly alongside ISDS.24 In addition, some matters are expressly carved out of ISDS
provisions and left to states to resolve exclusively or before the issues can proceed to ISDS. These
carve-outs serve to narrow the role of ISDS and put more control over designated issues or policy
areas into the hands of states for political and/or legalized dispute resolution by domestic officials
and/or treaty bodies. States have done this for particularly complex or sensitive areas, such as
financial services, tax measures, ad-hoc issues such as tobacco controls, and potentially broad
categories of “public welfare” measures.25
New Alternatives Re-examining “Political” Resolutions
While the incorporation of ISDS into IIAs was based, in large part, on the desire to “depoliticize”
investment disputes and remove the home-state from involvement, the reality and desirability of this
premise is increasingly being questioned and some very recent treaties have incorporated new
thinking on the role for states in investment disputes. Brazil, for example, has been promoting and
signing a breed of investment treaties (Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements (CIFAs))
that rely entirely on inter-state mechanisms to identify, avoid, and resolve barriers to cross-border
investment and disputes between investors and states.26 Brazil’s CIFAs focus on cooperation and
investment facilitation and promote amicable dispute settlement with state-state dispute resolution as
a last resort. The CIFAs create a joint governmental committee that monitors and implements the
CIFA, and also has a mandate to coordinate investment cooperation among governments, the private
sector and civil society, including preventing and resolving conflicts in an amicable way.27 Each party
to a CIFA is required to establish an ombudsman to provide support to foreign investors and to
provide information or assistance with domestic legal or treaty issues.28 When a dispute does arise,
and if mandatory governmental consultations and negotiations surrounding disputes fail, a party is
permitted to initiate a proceeding before the joint committee in which the investor, government
agencies and civil society are permitted to participate.29 In replacing ISDS with a joint governmental
committee, Brazil is edging back toward the “politicization” that was once feared, but with a new
approach.

Regarding impacts on investment flows, the ways that state-state dispute settlement would
potentially influence investment flows – by providing a signaling function, demonstrating a
credible commitment, and impacting the rule of law – align with the theories regarding why ISDS
might influence investor decisions, though there are some differences. With state-state dispute
24

Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, ‘State-State Dispute Settlement In Investment Treaties’ in Kavaljit
Singh, Burghard Ilge (eds) Rethinking Bilateral Investment Treaties (Both Ends, Madhyam, SOMO 2014).
25
See, e.g., Australia-China FTA, arts. 9.11(4)-(8), 9.19; Australia-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, art.
13(5).
26
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘Brazil’s Innovative Approach to International
Investment Law’ (IISD Blog, 15 September 2015) <www.iisd.org/blog/brazils-innovative-approachinternational-investment-law> accessed 1 April 2019; Martin Dietrich Brauch, ‘The Brazil-Mozambique and
Brazil-Angola Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements (CIFAs): A Descriptive Overview’
(Investment Treaty News, 21 May 2015) <www.iisd.org/itn/2015/05/21/the-brazil-mozambique-and-brazilangola-cooperation-and-investment-facilitation-agreements-cifas-a-descriptive-overview/> accessed 1 April
2019.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
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settlement, the enforceability of the commitment may not be as strong, as the number of potential
claimants is reduced. On the other hand, some have found that ISDS claims against a host state
(even claims that are ultimately unsuccessful) are linked to a drop in FDI in that state.30 If the claims
are based on an interpretation of treaty obligations that go beyond what the state parties to the treaty
intended, then the existence ISDS cases may be poor and overbroad proxies for whether states’
commitments to investors are in fact credible. In tension with the increasing-investment-flows
objective, this means that ISDS can potentially do undue reputational harm to host countries,
causing drops in FDI for even treaty-compliant conduct. State-state dispute settlement could help
avoid this outcome by producing fewer claims alleging unduly broad interpretations of IIA
commitments.
With respect to domestic rule of law, state-state mechanisms (such as that established in the EU to
address systemic rule of law challenges in EU Member States) can play a better role in supporting
just, effective and rule-based domestic governance.
In terms of the “depoliticization” objective, here, as well, state-state dispute settlement could offer
some advantages over ISDS. The introduction of ISDS into IIAs is said to have been motivated in
part by eliminating the “political” role of home states in determining whether to bring or settle
cases, and in preventing home-host state relations from being soured by investor-state disputes.
Depoliticization can be useful to the investor (who, with ISDS, is relatively free to bring claims
irrespective of its home state’s support or approval), the home state (who, with ISDS, can tell its
investors it won’t engage on their behalf, focusing on other diplomatic priorities), and the host state
(who, with ISDS, can resolve investor-state disputes in legalized dispute settlement free from added
pressure by home states).
Commentators are increasingly questioning whether it is prudent, desirable, and even possible,31 to
truly depoliticize investment disputes by eliminating participation by home states in relation to
claims of their investors (see box). There may, instead, be reasons for placing different types of
disputes at different places along the spectrum between purely political, and strictly legalized,
dispute resolution; indeed, evidence from other fora demonstrate that state-state disputes can still
be “legalized”.32
State-state mechanisms (including domestic law and policy to implement those mechanisms) could
also be designed to better ensure that decisions on whether to advance cases are taken on objective,
principled and merit-based grounds, and not, for instance, on capture and cronyism, in which those
companies with the greatest political connections and clout are most likely to secure home country
support. There could be criteria and procedures adopted at the domestic level to govern, for
instance, whether or when a state should or should not pursue claims of one of its investors or a

30

Emma Aisbett, Matthias Busse, and Peter Nunnenkamp, ‘Investment Treaties as Deterrents of HostCountry Discretion: The Impact of Investor-State Disputes on Foreign Direct Investment in Developing
Countries’ (2018) 154 Review of World Economics 119; Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt. ‘Contingent
Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment’ (2011) 65
International Organization 401.
31
Theodore Posner, Marguerite Walter, ‘The Abiding Role of State-State Engagement in the Resolution of
Investor-State Disputes’ in Jean E. Kalicki, Anna Joubin-Bret (eds), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute
Settlement System (Brill Nijhoff 2015).
32
Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal, ‘The
Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54(3) International Organization 401.
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class of investors, transparency regarding decisions, and structural mechanisms for insulating those
decisions from political pressure.33
Additionally, once a case has been initiated, treaties could establish strictly legalized dispute
resolution systems so that matters are resolved based on the rule of law rather than on power, or
variations that include more political aspects, depending, for instance, on the type of claim. As
noted above, state investment treaty practice currently reflects an interest by states in retaining a
political role for some important and sensitive issues,34 while also establishing a mechanism for
legalized dispute resolution of others.
Importantly, thoughtful improvements to state-state consultation and dispute settlement
mechanisms can improve outcomes not only for investors (for whom ISDS is not necessarily
attractive or feasible), but also for host states. Host states continue to face political pressure
notwithstanding the availability of ISDS,35 and also face uncertainty regarding whether the home
state will or will not intervene in ISDS disputes to address issues of treaty interpretation. 36
Thoughtful approaches to state-state dispute settlement can also better account for the broader
interests sought to be protected by treaties’ environmental, labor, human rights, and governancerelated provisions. There have been important studies documenting the failed promise of these
sustainable development-related provisions, highlighting the limited effectiveness and utility to
date of state-state mechanisms for raising and resolving broader environmental and social interests
and concerns that can be caused and exacerbated by the treaties’ liberalization and protection
provisions. 37 Thus, reformed and updated approaches to state-state engagement and dispute
settlement could help address a range of issues and priorities held by various state and non-state
actors.
Finally, in terms of securing compensation for losses, it is plausible that some investors will judge
state-state dispute mechanisms less favorably than ISDS. States do, and under a state-state system
may remain likely to, bring fewer claims than investors would under the same circumstances. As
such, to the extent that investors win awards in ISDS cases (which is the case) a transition to a statestate system may have a negative impact on investors’ ability to secure financial awards. But there
may also be advantages for investors seeking relief. 38 In addition to enabling the investor to stay
behind-the-scenes, state-state proceedings could be used, for instance, to secure declaratory
33
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judgment that a certain domestic measure in the host state is inconsistent with the treaty. That, in
turn, could help advance domestic reform for the benefit of a broader class of investors, not just the
claimants. This might be especially important for small investors, or when the challenged measure
has low or minimal dollar-value effects. State-state actions for declaratory relief might also make
it easier for individual investors to seek remedies before the host state’s courts, human rights fora,
or under political risk insurance.
Similarly, state-state mechanisms could be used to reach a global settlement of all claims by the
home state’s investors impacted by the host state’s conduct, and potentially distribute the benefits
of that settlement to affected investors. The state could also use state-state mechanisms to establish
claims proceedings in particular circumstances.
Thus, despite perceptions that investors prefer to go-it-alone without interference by their home
states, that home states use investment treaties to resist their investors’ requests to provide
diplomatic support, and that home states’ engagement with host states is always forceful and
undesirable, reality paints a more nuanced picture, demonstrating an existing and potentially
increasing role for home states in helping investors secure relief in investor-state disputes.

Human Rights Mechanisms
Much like ISDS, the range of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms established under
international human rights treaties are notable within the broader sphere of public international law
for providing beneficiaries with direct rights of action against states, despite the fact that, like
investors, human rights petitioners are generally not considered “subjects” of public international
law.39 Resort by investors to human rights mechanisms may thus be appropriate in certain limited
circumstances where fundamental rights have been infringed. This alternative could complement
the availability of other options discussed in this working paper, such as state-state mechanisms,
by creating a “fallback guarantee” in the context of egregious acts or omissions committed by host
states with respect to investors, including cases involving denials of justice.
With respect to encouraging investment flows, a host state’s compliance with human rights law,
coupled with the availability of human rights monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, could be
argued to create similar perceptions or “signals” regarding the rule of law, transparent legal
frameworks, and credible commitments concerning these standards, as are alleged of IIAs. Indeed,
the links between human rights law and improvement of the rule of law in host states are likely to
be stronger and more positive than those argued to exist between ISDS and domestic rule of law.
Parallels can also be drawn between the depoliticization aims of ISDS and the depoliticization of
human rights cases. Like ISDS, human rights law seeks to insulate consideration of cases and
enforcement of states’ obligations from interference by political pressures and interests. It provides
individuals, groups, and (in some cases) legal entities with direct rights of action against states.
While diplomatic and political interests and pressures can play a role in the determinations rendered
by human rights tribunals and other authorities, and in the enforcement of those determinations, the
limited research available on depoliticization in ISDS suggests that there, too, political engagement
may continue alongside, and not be entirely replaced by, private actors’ direct rights of action
against states. 40 In both systems, the questions therefore relate to understanding
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desirable/undesirable relationships between diplomatic engagement and legalized claims, and how
to govern those relationships effectively.
With respect to the objective of strengthening rule of law, human rights mechanisms specifically
prioritize the strengthening of domestic governance for all stakeholders. 41 From a procedural
perspective, claimants must exhaust local remedies prior to bringing a grievance before a human
rights tribunal or UN treaty body, unless they can justify non-exhaustion on specific grounds.42
This requirement gives domestic judicial systems and institutions the opportunity and the incentive
to rectify a harm caused, both with respect to a specific case and more generally regarding
improvement of domestic legal and regulatory frameworks or processes. By contrast, exhaustion
of local remedies is required by a relatively small number of IIAs,43 and ISDS creates a substitute
system for the determination or settlement of investment disputes that can undermine – or at least
dis-incentivize – strengthening of legal and other institutions at the domestic level.
Moreover, protection under international human rights law is not contingent on nationality nor on
possession of certain economic assets. As a result, the rule of law concerns that ISDS raises –
concerns relating to unequal access to justice and inequality under the law44 – do not arise in the
context of human rights law and related enforcement mechanisms.
With respect to the objective of providing compensation, international human rights law requires
that states must provide effective remedies for violated rights. The ICCPR, for example, requires
state parties to “ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated
shall have an effective remedy.”45 The Human Rights Committee underscored the importance of
reparation under international human rights law, noting that “[w]ithout reparation… the obligation
to provide an effective remedy… is not discharged.”46 The right to an effective remedy is also
41
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enshrined in regional and other international human rights instruments.47 While ISDS has tended
to focus primarily on compensatory relief, a range of remedies are commonly applied under
international human rights law, including inter alia restitution, monetary compensation,
rehabilitation (in the form of medical, psychological, social or legal services), satisfaction (relating
directly to the nature of each violation), and non-repetition (directed at preventing future
violations).48
Notably, however, regional human rights courts and UN treaty bodies primarily accept complaints
from natural persons, not legal entities. At the regional level, only the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) has consistently and explicitly allowed corporations to directly bring claims before
the Court. Regional mechanisms also offer much narrower protections, if any, for minority and
indirect shareholders, than protections enforced under ISDS.49 The distinction between the legal
standing of investors under international human rights and investment law, respectively, should
prompt a closer examination of whether and, if so, why investors as a specific group of claimants
merit a higher level of protection at the international level than that available to all natural (and in
some cases legal) persons under human rights law. Nevertheless, while human rights protections for
legal entities are limited, human rights frameworks could be used to address a subset of harms
individuals and, in some contexts, firms, may face when investing and operating abroad.
Another limitation of human rights mechanisms as compared to ISDS is that international human
rights law does not tend to protect property and other economic interests to the same extent as
ISDS. While compensation requirements for expropriation exist under the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) and American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) does not explicitly require compensation for
legal takings of property.50 Furthermore, in applying the requirements under the ECHR, the ECtHR
has often deferred to national authorities with respect to compensation, and has also tended to
consider the nature of the public interest underlying the taking in determining the quantum. 51
Similarly, the ECtHR tends to engage in a balancing assessment between public and private
interests when determining compensation for indirect expropriations. 52 By contrast, investment
tribunals have tended to focus more singularly on the impact of the alleged indirect expropriation
47
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on the investor. 53 These and other factors may account for the higher levels of compensation
generally awarded by investment tribunals as compared to the amounts awarded by human rights
tribunals.54
Furthermore, there is a legitimate position that human rights fora should not be used or relied upon
for the benefit of corporate interests because the origin of human rights as a matter of dignity differs
from the origins of corporate protection, corporate interests already wield immense power at the
global and local levels, and funneling such disputes through human rights fora may further burden
an already over-burdened system, thereby undermining access to justice for non-investor
individuals and groups.
Resort to human rights mechanisms is therefore only likely to be appropriate in very limited
circumstances where host states are alleged to have committed grave or systemic violations of the
rights of investors as individuals or, in the case of the ECHR, as legal entities. Nonetheless, this
alternative is important to consider among the mix of instruments and tools that investors can use
to protect their rights and pursue remedies, and that codify, establish, and seek to enforce relevant
international norms of state conduct.

Conclusion
As has been discussed widely elsewhere, ISDS can be very costly with very few proven benefits.55
The alternatives set forth here, especially when used in concert, have the ability to address many
of the objectives envisioned for ISDS without the same costs. Eliminating ISDS does not raise
perils of gunboat diplomacy, where legalized dispute settlement is replaced by use of power and
force. Investors would still be able to secure compensation for unlawful government conduct, while
preserving respect for the rule of law, international obligations, and broad rights of access to justice.
These alternatives, alone and together, do not necessarily serve each of the four often stated
objectives of ISDS to the same extent as ISDS does. The alternatives may outperform ISDS in some
areas but underperform in others, such as in the case of providing compensation to corporations for
economic losses. It is worth noting, however, that the oft-stated objectives of ISDS may themselves
be outdated and would benefit from a refresh; as noted extensively above and in our companion
piece on ISDS objectives, depoliticization should not be a primary objective, nor should efforts to
incentivize all kinds of cross-border financial flows, or to offer broad protections for the economic
interests of investors. The globally-agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) may provide a
more useful framework for updating the objectives, and assessing the impacts of IIAs and their
dispute settlement mechanisms on those aims. Nevertheless, whether from the perspective of the
traditional or revisited objectives, it is valuable to consider the benefits and costs of each alternative
mechanism for resolving disputes, and whether and how they could be utilized to better catalyze
and govern international investment than the ISDS model pursued in recent decades.
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